What are the likely consequences of Brexit for the status and rights of British citizenship? Can the fact that every British national is an EU citizen mitigate the possible negative consequences of the UK's withdrawal from the EU on the plane of rights enjoyed by the citizens of the UK? These questions are not purely hypothetical, as the referendum on June 23 can potentially mark one of the most radical losses in the value of a particular nationality in recent history. This paper reviews the possible impact that the law and practice of EU citizenship can have on the conduct of Brexit negotiations and surveys the possible strategies the UK government could adopt in extending at least some EU-level rights to UK citizens post-Brexit. The high cost of such rights at the negotiating table is discussed against the general backdrop of the legal-historical analysis of the tradition of flexibility in citizenship and territorial governance which clearly emerges in EU law once the post-colonial context is considered in full. A particular emphasis is put on the possibility of negotiating post-Brexit bilateral free-movement arrangements with select Member States: a deeply problematic practice from the point of view of non-discrimination and the basic idea of European unity. Aiming to address the core issues of the role of EU citizenship in the context of withdrawals from the Union the conclusions of the paper, pointing to a quasi-inevitable overwhelming downgrade in citizenship rights for the withdrawing state, are applicable to any withdrawal context, not limited to the UK per se.
A number of interesting issues arises, however, even when one looks only at the citizenship issues related to the Member States planning to say goodbye to the journey in the unknown destination. 6 This is particularly so when the interplay of both the national and the supranational levels of citizenship is dynamically considered. Although my initial aspiration has been to provide a general analysis, on a number of occasions it has been impossible to overcome the temptation of referring to one specific Member State as an example: the United Kingdom. Whatever the outcome of the Brexit referendum, the example of the UK will remain sound, as it is specifically the UK, not any other Member State that triggered the whole debate on withdrawals from the EU. The discussion contained below, although written 'fundamental status of the nationals of the Member States' 8 in EU law. To impose it -and all the supranational law that comes with it -on a people of a Member State that has just voted precisely to leave the Union would be an aberration of common sense, since it will be a direct attack on the letter and purpose of Article 50 TEU, which, ultimately, leaves the precise conditions of withdrawal up to negotiators.
This being said, EU citizenship disapplication to the nationals of the withdrawing Member State has very far-reaching implications in terms of rights which should not be underestimated: a 'full' withdrawal would put the nationals of the withdrawing state into a worse position than the citizens of the third countries benefiting from non-discrimination clauses in the agreements with the EU. 9 This means that UK citizens in the EU would have a legal position inferior to Russians and Moroccans, besides losing all the wellknown perks of EU citizenship ranging from free movement in the EU, nondiscrimination on the basis of nationality within the scope of application of EU law, political rights at local and EP level in the country of residence, consular protection abroad via the representations of other Member States of the EU and others, 10 ultimately resulting in the reduction of fundamental rights, which are unquestionably connected to the status of EU citizenship. 11 Currently one of the top-quality nationalities in the world, UK citizenship will drop quite radically in quality after Brexit as a result of the loss of free movement rights in 27 Member States.
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Such situation is absolutely bound to have political implications, necessarily making the negotiators in charge of arranging the exact agreement behind leaving the Union mindful of the far-reaching nature of the losses in terms of rights that citizens are likely to experience in the cases of Member State(s) leaving. It seems it would be too cynical of the negotiators of the withdrawing state to assume that reducing UK citizens residing (or, importantly, wishing in the future to reside) in the other Member States to a status inferior to that of some third-country nationals with unprivileged relationship with the EU would be acceptable, even if this seems to have been the position of the British government and the British courts all along. Judges have argued, quite astonishingly, that UK citizens residing elsewhere in the EU cannot make a claim against disenfranchisement in the withdrawal referendum since they will not be more affected by the outcome that UK citizens residing in the UK.
13
In other words, EU citizenship, while not really a 'force' (legally speaking at least) in the withdrawal context, is thus bound to play an important role politically. The key reason why is very simple: leaving the Union without negotiating any arrangement in terms of citizenship rights which would be either bilateral with the individual Member States of the EU or EU-oriented, 12 See, for a meticulous methodology of measuring nationality quality applied to all the nationalities in the word, D. Kochenov of the withdrawing state) could sound unjustified in terms of the sheer difference of scale between the two groups facing the unnecessary reduction of rights, it is necessary to take the loss of rights by the remaining EU citizens following the point of one state's withdrawal equally into account. From a purely pragmatic point of view it could be presented as a positive development, of course, that one is due to lose rights on either side, since when both parties are threatened with a loss, a more productive dialogue could be said to be more likely. This increases the chances of an amicable negotiated solution leading to the minimization of the loss of rights. The emphasis on rights is crucial in this respect, since the name of the legal status bringing the key rights is a contingency, of course: we can safely assume that the political logic of withdrawal under Article 50 TEU would demand dropping the pompous 'citizenship' label. Core EU citizenship rights can easily be provided without, however, to which the current position of Switzerland and the EEA countries vis-à-vis the EU clearly testifies.
At this point it is easy to guess the answer that this contribution will offer with respect to the key question which looms large in the context of the interplay of withdrawals from the Union and EU citizenship. The question is whether a dramatic loss of rights by the citizens on both sides of the newlyemerging EU border is an inevitable follow-up of a withdrawal of a Member State from the Union, or, alternatively, could some legal-political tools be found to avoid it? This question is obviously a tricky one. Any arrangement granting quasi-citizenship of the EU to the citizens of the Member State withdrawing from the Union will de facto result in affecting negatively the core considerations behind wanting to withdraw -whatever these can bethus openly playing against the objective, which such a withdrawal is seeking to achieve. The resulting political balance here can be very tricky: how much can real and tangible rights of the withdrawing state's own citizens be cut in the name of the goals its withdrawal is aiming to achieve (however arcane these goals could seem)? This balance will be for the politicians of the withdrawing state to try to execute, keeping in mind that maintaining an EEA-like arrangement with the EU in the context of the free-movement of persons will obviously have a price at the negotiating table. This price will necessarily include reciprocal arrangements for EU citizens in the withdrawing Member State or other important concessions necessarily and obviously limiting the effects of withdrawal from the Union. Besides depending on the negotiating position of the other party, such balancing will be bound by a full realization that whatever outcome is reached, it is bound to disappoint some part of the citizenry, should a 'true withdrawal' be to a particular public authority, which is usually territorial in essence. 25 Classical understandings of a state in legal literature make both citizenship and territory indispensable elements of statehood, which necessarily connects the two. Any mutation of the legal status of the territory can thus naturally be expected to have consequences for the citizenship status of (at least some of) the inhabitants. Crucially, the core right of any citizenship relates to the ability to enter the territory the status is associated with and remain there free of any border controls -a principle recognized in international and EU law. This picture is obviously too simplistic to reflect reality in full. While a notable connection between citizenship and territory is always there, the two function in radically different realms and frequently do not overlap in practice. In a metaphor effectively deployed by Rainer Bauböck, if political maps of the world would be drawn to show the citizenship of each individual in the territory of each of the states, rather than simply colouring state territory in a corresponding colour, the resulting picture will be a pixelated representation of an intricate reality that will show with clarity how citizenship and territory actually do not overlap. When speaking about withdrawals, it is absolutely necessary to have both pictures in mind. The dominant one, drawing a clear and idealistic line between citizenship and territoriality on the one hand and a less clean pixelated world, which Bauböck had in mind, on the other. Importantly, both will inform the thinking about the potential influence of citizenship on the organization and outcomes of withdrawals of Member States from the Union.
In other words, citizenship rights, including the core ones, such as voting, can have a significant role to play outside the territory, 37 while plenty of those who are present in the territory will not enjoy the plenitude of rights enjoyed by the majority of citizens, even though the discrepancies here are thinning away very fast.
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Given that EU citizenship is not that different, as a legal status, from the nationalities of the Member States from which it derives, it is similarly as nonterritorial in essence, as it is connected to the territory. Crucially, while the majority of rights are then only available in the Union as such -including the rights to work, to reside, etc. clearly does not work. Moreover, EU law makes clear that some rights of EU citizenship which are not territorial per se and can thus be enjoyed outside EU territory, such as the general principle of non-discrimination, equally apply to all EU citizens of particular nationality residing outside of the territory of the EU.
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The same cannot be said of the most important, territorial rights, which cannot be enjoyed by EU citizens outside of the territory of the Union, be it in the Faeroe Islands, Socotra, Aruba, or Koh Samui.
In order to come to a conclusion which right of EU citizenship will be operational outside of the Union territory and which not, it is necessary to go right by right, conducting individual analysis. It is clear that once a Member State withdraws, the majority of supranational rights enjoyed by EU citizens in its territory will by definition disappear in thin air, unless otherwise negotiated, since the national territory will not anymore make part of the territory of the Union. EU law as such cannot possibly limit the principle of its own non-application in the territory of the withdrawing state, since there is 
regulations. In the case of the UK this means that the EU Citizens Free
Movement Directive, as implemented in national law, will no doubt continue applying until the time it is expressly overruled. Moreover, such overruling will have to comply with the national constitutional requirements of legal certainty, the protection of human rights and the rule of law. The same applies to countless other instruments. Arguing to the contrary would imply arguing for a complete chaos supplanting the law, given the depth of the interpenetration of national and European at this stage. In other words, the drastic consequences of withdrawals for the rights of EU citizens, while absolute for those who have not used those rights yet, are in all likelihood somewhat tamed in the case of those who already reside across the newlyemerging EU border. Ultimately, however, this issue is bound to be one of the core aspects of the political negotiations under Article 50 TEU.
Unlike the non-application of EU law and rights to the territory of the seceding state post-secession, the contrary is true with regard to the status of EU citizenship: all those holding EU citizenship acquired on the basis of a connection with any of the Member States but the withdrawing one will keep their status and will be able to enjoy the plenitude of rights connected to it, once returning to the territory of the Union (while being able to enjoy nonterritorial rights in the withdrawing state itself). This very basic understanding is behind the rising numbers of UK citizens wishing to acquire an Irish nationality, to which many of them are entitled by law. 47 There is a consensus in the literature that naturalising excessively large numbers of people at once could amount to a breach of EU law due to possible negative externalities for the other Member States. The exact threshold to understand when this rule is applicable is relatively high, however. Even naturalising 1.000.000 foreigners abroad over ten years, as Italy has done in Argentina, seems to be fully legal and has not caused any criticism, while smaller scale naturalisations in Bulgaria (as applied to Macedonians) and Romania (as applied to Moldovans) not infrequently receive negative press, supplying a clear example of dual standards in the EU. Given that a million per ten years is clearly acceptable, however, one could doubt if Ireland, in one example, could naturalise all the willing population of the UK without breaching EU law. Important in this context is that the ECJ consistently ignores involuntary naturalisations: Case 21/74, Jeanne Airola v. Comm'n [1975[ E.C.R. 221. 48 The ability to disconnect Member State nationality from EU citizenship, although confirmed in Kaur, is much more difficult for the Member States to use after Rottmann, which is a positive development, as it reduces the likelihood of invoking the right to bring unilateral declarations on the meaning of nationality for the purposes of EU law by the Member States wishing to deprive of rights certain minority groups among their citizens. The same applies to some candidate countries. 55 Constitutional permutations of territory and, consequently, of citizenship, are thus quite common in the European context. . 55 In one example, it was due to the EU's efforts that a deal laying down the rules of the Montenegrin independence referendum was brokered between the pro-and anti-independence movements. Following EU recommendations, it was decided that for independence to be gained, a 55% majority was required. Member States, 65 but also other countries, including loose protectorates that the EU has created. 66 Splitting up of the colonial empires, besides triggering the creation of new states, 67 produced large numbers of foreigners deprived of EU-level rights out of full citizens able to benefit from what European integration had to offer. 68 The developments here were not straight-forward. Some of the newlyemerging foreigners lost EU citizenship In a situation where such an independent supranational level status could be created, an array of legal options at hand would be significant, including, but not limited to four main options, tailored to ensure that the citizens of the withdrawing state do not lose supranational rights. This contribution is not the place to advocate for the creation of an autonomous status of supranational belonging. We should realize, however, that however improbable, it would be too much to say that it is legally or politically impossible.
1. Dual nationality of the EU and the withdrawing state. With the global rise of multiple nationality toleration, where dual nationality is not frowned upon in the majority of jurisdictions around the world, a combination of two nationalities could be the way forward, ensured by a legal arrangement that will allow independent EU citizenship not to expire for the nationals of the withdrawing Member State upon the departure of such state from the Union. Given that EU citizenship is not an independent status, however, this option is not applicable, without a serious reform of the law, unless one (or several) of the Member States wishes to naturalise all the citizens of the withdrawing state, which could be highly problematic from the point of view of EU law as discussed above;
2. Common nationality shared by the EU and the withdrawing state. This is an advanced variation on the previous option, the plausibility of which is weak for the same reason, which does not make this option impossible In fact, plenty of entities in the world share some variation of an arrangement of this kind. It is particularly favoured by the semiindependent entities, which the UK will most likely end-up being as an outcome of the secession negotiations, given the high costs or a total refusal to associate itself with the EU acquis and the internal market. All importantly, free movement, are territorial in nature, and, knowing that the territory of the withdrawing state will not be part of EU territory for the purposes of such rights, it would be unclear why the Member States of the EU should take any such benevolent steps knowing that the territory of the withdrawing Member State will be off limits for EU citizens. This is an obvious opportunity to be used, however, since the UK government can obviously extend rights to EU nationals similarly to how it treats the citizens of the Republic of Ireland.
4. Lastly, and this option does not imply the creation of a truly independent EU citizenship status, an international agreement can be concluded between the withdrawing state and the EU and its Member States aiming at ensuring that free movement rights enjoyed by the nationals of all the parties involved, continue beyond the point of the state's withdrawal. This option, which could be part of a larger EEA-like framework created by the parties, will however clearly undermine the effect of withdrawal and could therefore not be fully politically viable, unless the withdrawal is officially triggered by the reasons unrelated to the issues of free movement and the management of the migration flows within the EU, which is not the case in the UK, in one crucial example.
The four options above will most likely not be politically viable both in practice (as they will require a Treaty change, or negotiating agreements de facto cancelling the effects of withdrawal from the EU) and in theory (as they assume that citizens voting for withdrawal want to remain EU citizens nevertheless -even if not in a name). In other words, these options will, in all likelihood, not be acceptable to the parties. This does not change the fact that plenty of outstanding problems caused by a Member State's withdrawal from the EU will need to be solved nevertheless.
The solutions to such problems will necessarily need to imply taking the wish of the people of the withdrawing state precisely to withdraw seriously. The most viable among these, could be the negotiation of bilateral free movement of persons agreements between the withdrawing state and a handful of Member States. Such agreements will, however, approach member state nationals in their national status capacity and will thus not be concerned with EU citizenship as such. 83 The calculations used to produce the figure assume that the UK's withdrawal from the EU terminates UK nationals' supranational rights and follows the methodology of the Quality of Nationality Index (2016), op cit.
